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fo·ren·sics n. (used with a sing. verb) 
1. The art or study of formal debate; argumentation. 
2. The use of science and technology to investigate and establish facts in 
criminal or civil courts of law. 




1. “Involves the preservation, identification, extraction, documentation, and 
interpretation of computer data.” 
(Computer Forensics: Incident Response Essentials, Warren Kruse and Jay Heiser.)
2. “The scientific examination, analysis, and/or evaluation of digital evidence 
in legal matters.”
(Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, http://www.swgde.org)
So what’s digital evidence?
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Computer Forensics is like a magic camera
Tools can go “back in time...”
- View previous versions of files
- Recover “deleted” files
- Find out what was typed
- Discover visited websites
Why does this work?
- Computers keep extensive logs
- Most data is not encrypted
- free() doesn’t erase memory
- DELETE doesn’t erase files
- FORMAT doesn’t wipe disks
5
Digital Evidence is evidence found in digital 
systems.
Brian Carrier’s PhD has several definitions for digital evidence:
• “Information stored or transmitted in binary form that may be relied upon 
in court” [Int02] 
• “Information of probative value that is stored or transmitted in binary 
form” [Sci05] 
• “Information and data of investigative value that is stored on or 
transmitted by a computer” [Ass05] 
• “Any data stored or transmitted using a computer that support or refute a 
theory of how an offense occurred or that address critical elements of the 
offense such as intent or alibi” [Cas04] 
All of these definitions assume a legal process. 
Forensics can be used for much more.
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Computer Forensics are typically used 
after a crime is suspected
Computer break-ins:
• Determine how a computer was compromised.
• Determine extent of damage
Make a claim about the computer’s owner:
• Possession of contraband information
• Copyright infringement
• Theft of intellectual property
• Confirm/disprove an alibi 
7
Forensics can also be used for auditing
Evaluate the privacy properties of a system
Understand what’s actually going over a network
Audit application performance & security
Spot-check regulatory compliance:
• Data disposal policies
• Data flow across boundaries
Audit internal information flows
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1. The Forensic Process
2. Legal Standards
3. Specific Forensic Techniques
• Disk Forensics
• Network Forensics 
• Document Forensics
• Memory Forensics
• Cell Phone Forensics
• Software Forensics
4. Anti-Forensics
5. Civil and Criminal Applications
This tutorial looks at the range of forensic 
techniques currently in use
many of these sources, their credibility was difficult to assess and was often left to the foreign
government services to judge. Intelligence Community HUMINT efforts against a closed society
like Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom were hobbled by the Intelligence Community's
dependence on having an official U.S. presence in-country to mount clandestine HUMINT
collection efforts.
(U) When UN inspectors departed Iraq, the placement of HUMINT agents and the
development of unilateral sources inside Iraq were not top priorities for the Intelligence
Community. The Intelligence Community did not have a single HUMINT source collecting
against Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs in Iraq after 1998. The Intelligence
Community appears to have decided that the difficulty and risks inherent in developing sources
or inserting operations officers into Iraq outweighed the potential benefits. The Committee
found no evidence that a lack of resources significantly prevented the Intelligence Community
from developing sources or inserting operations officers into Iraq.
When Committee staff asked why the CIA had not considered
placing a CIA officer in Iraq years before Operation Iraqi Freedom to investigate Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction programs, a CIA officer said, "because it's very hard to sustain . . . it takes a
rare officer who can go in . . . and survive scrutiny | ^ | [ m | | | for a long time." The
Committee agrees that such operations are difficult and dangerous, but they should be within the
norm of the CIA's activities and capabilities. Senior CIA officials have repeatedly told the
Committee that a significant increase in funding and personnel will be required to enable to the
CIA to penetrate difficult HUMINT targets similar to prewar Iraq. The Committee believes,
however, that if an officer willing and able to take such an assignment really is "rare" at the CIA,
the problem is less a question of resources than a need for dramatic changes in a risk averse
corporate culture.
(U) Problems with the Intelligence Community's HUMINT efforts were also evident in
the Intelligence Community's handling of Iraq's alleged efforts to acquire uranium from Niger.
The Committee does not fault the CIA for exploiting the access enjoyed by the spouse of a CIA
employee traveling to Niger. The Committee believes, however, that it is unfortunate,
considering the significant resources available to the CIA, that this was the only option available.
Given the nature of rapidly evolving global threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons and weapons technology, the Intelligence Community must develop means to quickly
respond to fleeting collection opportunities outside the Community's established operating areas.
The Committee also found other problems with the Intelligence Community's follow-up on the
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Electronic Crime Scene Investigation Guide, 
National Institute of Justice
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Step 1: Preparation
Identify potential sources of evidence
Computer system components:
• Hard drives
• Memory / flash / configuration
• Physical configuration
Web Pages on other computers
Files
Communication networks
Each source may need its own personnel, tools, training & procedures.
One of the most difficult tasks is determining what to include & exclude.
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If the activity is ongoing, your choices include:
• Passive Monitoring
• Experimental Probing
If the activity is over, choices include:
• Make a copy
• Seizure 
Issues to consider:
• What tools are used? Are they validated?
• Is the copy accurate? Is it complete?
• How can you prove that the copy wasn’t modified at a later time?
Step 2:
Collect and Preserve the evidence
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Step 3: Examination.
Make evidence “visible” and eliminated excess.
Disk Analysis:
• Examine partitions and file systems
• Resident files & delete files
• “Slack space” at end of files




• Metadata (creation date; author fields; etc.)
Network Evidence:
• Device configuration
• Categorize packets; discard what isn’t needed
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Step 4: Analyze to determine 
“significance and probative value”
Build a hypothesis about what happened.
Look for evidence to prove or disprove hypothesis.
Examples: 
• Hypothesis: Suspect is arrested on suspicion of child pornography
• Evidence: Known child pornography on suspect’s hard drive
• Hypothesis: Suspect broke into a telephone company computer and stole 
confidential documents.
• Evidence: Hacker tools; confidential information from telco.
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BUT:
Investigators rarely look for count-evidence
Build a hypothesis about what happened.
Look for evidence to prove or disprove hypothesis.
Examples: 
• Hypothesis: Suspect is arrested on suspicion of child pornography
• Evidence: Known child pornography on suspect’s hard drive
• Counter Evidence: Root kit allowing remote access
• Hypothesis: Suspect broke into a telephone company computer and stole 
confidential documents.
• Evidence: Hacker tools; confidential information from telco.
• Counter Evidence: Documents publicly available 
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Testimony needs to include several key points:
• The tools used and procedures that were followed 
• What was found
• Examiner’s interpretation of what it means
Step 5:








The Digital Crime Scene Investigation model 
has five similar steps.
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This isn’t really what happens in reality.
Instead, investigations are guided by “hypotheses.”
Goal of most investigations is to explain evidence that is observed.
• Investigations asked to answer questions about previous states or events.
• Investigator encounters the machine.
• Investigator uses tools to extract and preserve information from machine
“Because the observation of the data is indirect, a hypothesis must be 
formed that the actual data is equal to the observed data”
“Hypotheses also need to be formulated about the data abstractions 
that exist and the previous states and events that occurred.”
• The investigator searches for data that supports or refutes the hypotheses.
• Information may be used for confirming/eliminating a hypotheses even if 
the information itself is inadmissible in court.
A Hypothesis-Based Approach to Digital Forensic Investigations, 
Brian D. Carrier, PhD Thesis, June 2006
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Legal Standards
US Federal Rules of Evidence
Daubert
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US Federal Rules of Evidence article VIII 
regulates the testimony of “experts”
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts
Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue
Rule 705. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion
Rule 706. Court Appointed Experts
These rules apply in the Federal Court; many states follow the rules as well
• http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/
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Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified 
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if 
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, 
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts 
of the case.”
22
Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts
“The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion 
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or 
before the hearing. 
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. 
Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury 
by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that 
their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion 
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”
23
Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an 
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of 
a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether 
the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an 
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are 
matters for the trier of fact alone.
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The “Daubert Standard” is supposed to keep 
“junk science” out of the courts.
Daubert turns federal judges “gatekeepers.” 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 US 579 (1993)
• Evidence must be “relevant”
• Evidence must be “reliable” (ie, scientific)
• Subject to peer review (has been published)
• Generally accepted by the relevant professional community
• Standards for the technique’s operation
• Known error rate
Surprisingly, digital evidence may not meet this standard. 
[Carrier 2006,  pp. 1-4]
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The “CSI Effect” causes victims and juries
to have unrealistic expectations.
Prosecutors & Jurors:
- Think it’s impossible to delete 
anything.
- Expect highly produced 
presentations. 




✓ The Forensic Process
✓ Legal Standards
3. Specific Forensic Techniques
• Disk Forensics
• Network Forensics 
• Document Forensics
• Memory Forensics
• Cell Phone Forensics
• Software Forensics
4. Anti-Forensics
5. Civil and Criminal Applications
This tutorial looks at the range of forensic 
techniques currently in use
many of these sources, their credibility was difficult to assess and was often left to the foreign
government services to judge. Intelligence Community HUMINT efforts against a closed society
like Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom were hobbled by the Intelligence Community's
dependence on having an official U.S. presence in-country to mount clandestine HUMINT
collection efforts.
(U) When UN inspectors departed Iraq, the placement of HUMINT agents and the
development of unilateral sources inside Iraq were not top priorities for the Intelligence
Community. The Intelligence Community did not have a single HUMINT source collecting
against Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs in Iraq after 1998. The Intelligence
Community appears to have decided that the difficulty and risks inherent in developing sources
or inserting operations officers into Iraq outweighed the potential benefits. The Committee
found no evidence that a lack of resources significantly prevented the Intelligence Community
from developing sources or inserting operations officers into Iraq.
When Committee staff asked why the CIA had not considered
placing a CIA officer in Iraq years before Operation Iraqi Freedom to investigate Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction programs, a CIA officer said, "because it's very hard to sustain . . . it takes a
rare officer who can go in . . . and survive scrutiny | ^ | [ m | | | for a long time." The
Committee agrees that such operations are difficult and dangerous, but they should be within the
norm of the CIA's activities and capabilities. Senior CIA officials have repeatedly told the
Committee that a significant increase in funding and personnel will be required to enable to the
CIA to penetrate difficult HUMINT targets similar to prewar Iraq. The Committee believes,
however, that if an officer willing and able to take such an assignment really is "rare" at the CIA,
the problem is less a question of resources than a need for dramatic changes in a risk averse
corporate culture.
(U) Problems with the Intelligence Community's HUMINT efforts were also evident in
the Intelligence Community's handling of Iraq's alleged efforts to acquire uranium from Niger.
The Committee does not fault the CIA for exploiting the access enjoyed by the spouse of a CIA
employee traveling to Niger. The Committee believes, however, that it is unfortunate,
considering the significant resources available to the CIA, that this was the only option available.
Given the nature of rapidly evolving global threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons and weapons technology, the Intelligence Community must develop means to quickly
respond to fleeting collection opportunities outside the Community's established operating areas.
The Committee also found other problems with the Intelligence Community's follow-up on the
- 2 5 -













• Timelines - when did the computer do what?
• Flow of information
• Evidence of Inappropriate use
Gather Intelligence:




Tools of the trade
Local acquisition:
• Write-Blockers prevent modification
• Create an “image file”
Mirror Disks:
• Work with a “mirror” of original disk
Network acquisition
• “Encase Enterprise” allows remote forensics on live system
GUI-Based Programs:
• Forensic Tool Kit
• Encase (Guidance Software)
• Forensic Toolkit (Accessdata)
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The important thing about disk imaging: 
get the data off the suspect drive, onto your drive.
Imaging options:
- dd if=/dev/hda of=diskfile.img
- aimage /dev/hda diskfile.img
- LinEn
Most tools will:
- copy the raw device to a file
- Compute MD5 & SHA1
Some tools will:
- Compress image
- Capture metadata like s/n
- Record investigative notes
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Once data is imaged, 
the investigator has many options:
Typical “first steps” include:
• Inventory all files (resident & deleted) on disk
• Show files modified during a certain time period
• Search disk for files with “known bads” (hacker tools, child porn)
• Scan for key words
32
“Deleted files” are left on the disk because “delete” 
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“Deleted files” are left on the disk because “delete” 














As a result, a typical disk has many kinds of files 
and data segments on it:
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Formatting a disk just writes a new root directory.
35







Formatting a disk just writes a new root directory.
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Example: Disk #70: IBM-DALA-3540/81B70E32 
Purchased for $5 from a Mass retail store on eBay 
Copied the data off: 541MB 
Initial analysis: 
• Total disk sectors: 1,057,392 
• Total non-zero sectors: 989,514 
• Total files: 3 
The files: 
drwxrwxrwx 0 root      0 Dec 31 1979 ./ 
-r-xr-xr-x 0 root 222390 May 11 1998 IO.SYS 
-r-xr-xr-x 0 root      9 May 11 1998 MSDOS.SYS 
-rwxrwxrwx 0 root  93880 May 11 1998 COMMAND.COM 
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Image this disk to a file, 
then use the Unix “strings” command:
% strings 70.img | more 
Insert diskette for drive 
and press any key when ready 
Your program caused a divide overflow error. 
If the problem persists, contact your program vendor. 
Windows has disabled direct disk access to protect your lo 
To override this protection, see the LOCK /? command for m 
The system has been halted. Press Ctrl+Alt+Del to restart 
You started your computer with a version of MS-DOS incompatible 
version of Windows. Insert a Startup diskette matching this 
OEMString = "NCR 14 inch Analog Color Display Enchanced SV 
Graphics Mode: 640 x 480 at 72Hz vertical refresh. 
XResolution = 640 
YResolution = 480 
38
% strings cont...
ling the Trial Edition 
---------------------------- 
IBM AntiVirus Trial Edition is a full-function but time-li 
evaluation version of the IBM AntiVirus Desktop Edition pr 
may have received the Trial Edition on a promotional CD-RO 
single-file installation program oveœr a network. The Tria 
is available in seven national languages, and each languag 























Roughly 1/3 of the discarded hard drives have 
significant amounts of confidential data.
From sampling 150 hard drives 
collected between 1998 and 
2002, we found:




- Highly personal information







Capture and Analysis of:
• packets in flight
• packets after the fact
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source port destination port
sequence number
Acknowledgement number
off res ECN Control Window
Checksum Urgent pointer







Systems can capture the entire packet 
or just the packet header
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!...           525 complete packets
Complete packets allows for reconstruction.
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!...           525 packet headers
10:52:16.294858 IP 192.168.1.102.58754 > www2.cnn.com.http: S 
10:52:16.370616 IP www2.cnn.com.http > 192.168.1.102.58754: S 
10:52:16.370700 IP 192.168.1.102.58754 > www2.cnn.com.http: . 
10:52:16.371114 IP 192.168.1.102.58754 > www2.cnn.com.http: P 
10:52:16.455120 IP www2.cnn.com.http > 192.168.1.102.58754: . 
10:52:19.956986 IP i7.cnn.net.http > 192.168.1.102.58755: . 
10:52:19.961475 IP i7.cnn.net.http > 192.168.1.102.58755: . 
10:52:19.981228 IP cnn1.dyn.cnn.com.http > 192.168.1.102.58766: 
10:52:19.983731 IP cl4.cnn.com.http > 192.168.1.102.58761: P 
With just headers, you can only get source, 
destination, size, timestamps, ports, etc.
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10:52:16.294858 IP 192.168.1.102.58754 > www2.cnn.com.http: S 
10:52:16.370616 IP www2.cnn.com.http > 192.168.1.102.58754: S 
10:52:16.370700 IP 192.168.1.102.58754 > www2.cnn.com.http: . 
10:52:16.371114 IP 192.168.1.102.58754 > www2.cnn.com.http: P 
10:52:16.455120 IP www2.cnn.com.http > 192.168.1.102.58754: . 
10:52:19.956986 IP i7.cnn.net.http > 192.168.1.102.58755: . 
10:52:19.961475 IP i7.cnn.net.http > 192.168.1.102.58755: . 
10:52:19.981228 IP cnn1.dyn.cnn.com.http > 192.168.1.102.58766: 
10:52:19.983731 IP cl4.cnn.com.http > 192.168.1.102.58761: P 
Count         Source     >   Destination
  46 i7.cnn.net.http     > 192.168.1.102.58755
  34 192.168.1.102.58755 > i7.cnn.net.http
  26 69.22.138.51.http   > 192.168.1.102.58776
  24 www2.cnn.com.http   > 192.168.1.102.58754
  21 192.168.1.102.58776 > 69.22.138.51.http
  19 192.168.1.102.58765 > i7.cnn.net.http
  17 64.236.29.63.http   > 192.168.1.102.58758
  17 192.168.1.102.58754 > www2.cnn.com.http
  16 i7.cnn.net.http     > 192.168.1.102.58765
  14 192.168.1.102.58759 > 64.236.29.63.http
  13 72.32.153.176.http  > 192.168.1.102.58769
  13 192.168.1.102.58769 > 72.32.153.176.http
  13 192.168.1.102.58758 > 64.236.29.63.http
  12 64.236.29.63.http   > 192.168.1.102.58759
  10 64.236.29.63.http   > 192.168.1.102.58778
  10 64.236.29.63.http   > 192.168.1.102.58757




Many switches and routers will report “netfow” 
data directly.
Each Cisco NetFlow record contains:
• Total bytes & packets
• S&D IP addresses
• S&D ports (UDP or TCP)
• flags
• start & end time
• min & max packet size
• VLANs & ifaces
• Vendor proprietary data
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Each computer and router generates log files.
Here’s what’s on my MacBook:
Date & Time of:
- OS installation
- Calendar syncs
- Wake from sleep & time slept
- Every program that crashed
- Every file installed
- Every log-in and log-out
Other information:
- Daily amount of free space
- Every 802.11 network found






Log files are kept on each host;
they can be aggregated into a central location
A central repository makes the logs more 
resistant to attack.
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Some vendors call this “deep packet inspection” 
or “deep packet analysis.”
Primary use is to discover inappropriate data transfer 
or service use:
• Use of outside chat or web mail services.
• Leaking protected health Information.
• Restrict information
Also good for debugging networks:
• Duplicate requests
• Incomplete transactions
• Discovery of vulnerabilities
without scanning








cycling record of 



















Packet monitoring is similar to wiretapping.
Passive Monitoring Options:
- Use an ethernet “hub” with a 
packet sniffer. 
- Set up a switched monitoring port. 
- Full-duplex networks may require 
two monitoring ports.
Active Monitoring Options:
- Monitor with a proxy or router.




“A DVR for an Internet connection.”
54
Internet Wiretapping History
1983 — Netwatch – Graphical display of Internet Traffic
1990 — First reports of hostile packet sniffers
1995 — Ardita (Harvard FAS monitored by FBI)
1997 — FBI / DOJ / Carnivore
1999 — Emergence of commercial tools
2003 — Cisco Systems adds “Lawful Intercept Controls” to switches to 
allow eavesdropping on VoIP conversations “without detection”
2007 — FBI reportedly adopts large-scale Internet surveillance techniques. 
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1996: Julio Caesar Ardita used 
Harvard FAS as a jump-off point
From Harvard, Ardita penetrated military and 
commercial systems throughout the world.
FBI installed TCP/IP stream reassembler with 





US Department of Justice develops “Omnivore”
Hodge-podge of technologies:
• Monitoring of IP and 
❚❚❚❚❚❚❚❚ protocols








1998: Omnivore renamed “Carnivore”
(“gets at the meat”)
Targeting Techniques:
• email usernames, RADIUS username
• IP address, DHCP mac address
Analysis:
• Logins & Logouts
• Email “pen register” (SMTP & RFC822)
• telnet
Apparently designed for medium-sized dial-up ISPs.
Renamed Digital Collection System 2000 (DSC2000)
Reportedly abandoned in favor of commercial and open source tools
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Is it reasonable to capture all the packets?
In 1991, Los Alamos captured all 
information in and out of the lab’s 
T1 on DAT tape:
• 8 gigabytes/day (50%)
Disks have gotten bigger faster 
than network connections have 
gotten faster.












• Amount of data
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Uses for Document Forensics
Which computer generated this document?
Who edited this document? 
What was changed? When?
Is this document “authentic?”
66
Approaches for Data and Document Analysis:
Look for hidden data:
• Deleted information; previous versions
• GIDs embedded in Microsoft Word document
Look for characteristic data:
• Indicates authorship
• Indicates program used to create document.
Look for inconsistent data:
• Indicates possible tampering.
67
Privacy and Security violations result when 
improperly sanitized documents are released.
Adobe PDF files:
• The New York Times published a PDF file containing the names of Iranians 
who helped with the 1953 coup.  (2000) (http://cryptome.org/cia-iran.htm)
• US DoJ published a PDF file “diversity report” with embarrassing
redacted information. (2003) (http://www.thememoryhole.org/feds/doj-
attorney-diversity.htm)
• Multinational Force-Iraq report (2005)
Microsoft Word Files:
• SCO Word file revealed its anti-Linux legal strategy.  (2004)
• Intelligence report by Blair Government was found to be plagiarized from a 
postgraduate student at the Monterey Institute of International Studies 
based on transaction log (2003) (http://www.computerbytesman.com/
privacy/blair.htm)
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Why is data left in documents?
1. Confusion between “covering data” and removing it.
2. Failure to implement “complete delete.”
3. Information that is written but never read.
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Most Acrobat leakage is a result of Microsoft Word.
70
Microsoft Word encourages people to use the 
highlight feature to eradicate data.
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Microsoft Word encourages people to use the 
highlight feature to eradicate data.
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When Microsoft Word generates the PDF file, 
“Secret Data” is covered with the black box
72
Tools for recovering hidden data in Acrobat files:
Adobe Illustrator
• Move the boxes
• Turn the boxes yellow
Adobe Acrobat Reader
• Select and copy the text
73
Adobe’s Illustrator can read and edit PDF files.
74
Select each “block box.”
75







































Data can be left in a Word document in unallocated 
sectors.
Microsoft Word implements a 
“file system” inside every file. 
78
Tools for recovering hidden Word data:
Unix strings(1) command reveals:
• Deleted text 
• Names and/or usernames of author and editors
• Paths where document was saved
• GUID of system on which it was saved






• MITRE’s Heuristic Office File Format Analysis toolkit (HOFFA) 
79
Tools for finding Microsoft Word files
Use Google!
• inurl:www.number-10.gov.uk filetype:doc confidential
80
Case study of inconsistent data:
State of Utah vs. Carl Payne
81
State of Utah vs. Carl Payne
State’s Claims:
• Victim ISP suffered devastating attack on November 6th, 1996.
• All files erased
• All router configurations cleared.
• Carl Payne, one of the company’s founders, had a falling out with the 
company and was terminated on October 30th, 1996.
• Payne had the necessary knowledge to carry out the attack.
• Payne created a “back door” on his last week of employment.
• Payne’s accounts were used for the attack.
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State of Utah vs. Carl Payne
State’s Evidence:
• 140 pages of printouts made by a local expert on the day of the attack. 
• Testimony of the expert.
• Testimony of the Fibernet employees
Payne’s Defense:
• “I didn’t do it.”
• All of Payne’s account passwords had been changed when he was 
terminated. 
• Alibi defense: was having breakfast with a friend when attack took place.
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/etc/shadow





Field 2: Encrypted Password
Field 3: Password Aging








| 1987-08-25                            |
+---------------------------------------+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> 
• August 25, 1987
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/etc/shadow
(Printed November 6, 1996 by prosecution expert witness)
9818 = November 18, 1996
6445 = August 25, 1987
9807 = November 7, 1996
9800 = October 31, 1996
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Lessons of Utah vs. Payne
Not all “Evidence” is equal (Chain-of-custody is vital)
Evidence may not prove what you think it proves
Computer evidence lends itself to forgery
Most data isn’t tampered...
• ... but most data isn’t used for evidence. 





















L1 Cache L2 Cache
Main 
Memory Disks
Computer systems arrange memory in a hierarchy. 
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• Firewire designed as a 
replacement for hard drives.
• ATA drives support DMA



























It’s pretty easy to attack a system with an iPod
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Many different kinds of information can be retrieved 
from a computer’s memory.
Reading:
• Current contents of the screen
• Cryptographic Keys




• Patch programs on the fly
• Change security levels
DMA bypasses the operating 
system and the CPU.
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Cell Phone Forensics
Who did you call?
Where have you been?
94
Cell Phone Forensics: What can be done




PHONE: Recovery of service information
• Cell sites passed, used
CELL SITES: Recovery of phone information
• Phones in the area
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Cell phone forensics: Precautions
Turning on the phone can damage data!
• But sometimes you can’t access the data any other way
96
Paraben’s tools for cell phone forensics
Paraben “Device Seizure” to image the phone’s content.
• Acquires phone flash and some of GSM SIM card
• Understands some of the phone’s internal databases
• Views some of the photos, messages, etc.
• Only covers specific phones
“Device Seizure Toolbox” has lots of different cables.




Cell Phone Forensics: References & Resources
Guidelines on Cell Phone Forensics (NIST SP 800-101)
• August 2006
• http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/Draft-SP800-101.pdf
Cell Phone Forensic Tools: An Overview and Analysis (NISTIR 7250)
• http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/nistir-7250.pdf




Who authored a program?
Are two programs similar?
How old is a program?
    if(dirlist.size()==0){
        if(argc!=2){
            fprintf(stderr,"Please specify a directory or just two AFF files.\n\n");
            usage();
        }
        /* Must be copying from file1 to file2. Make sure file2 does not exist */
        if(access(argv[1],R_OK)==0){
            errx(1,"File exists: %s\n",argv[1]);
        }
        vector<string> outfiles;
        outfiles.push_back(argv[1]);
        return afcopy(argv[0],outfiles);






Computer Forensics: “Scientific Knowledge for collecting, analyzing, and 
presenting evidence to the courts” (USCERT 2005)
Anti-Forensics: tools and techniques that frustrate forensic tools, investigations 
and investigators
Goals of Anti-Forensics:
• Avoiding detection 
• Disrupting information collection
• Increasing the examiner’s time
• Casting doubt on a forensic report or testimony (Liu and Brown, 2006)
• Forcing a tool to reveal its presence
• Subverting the tool — using it to attack the examiner or organization
• Leaving no evidence that the AF tool has been run
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Physical destruction makes forensic recovery 
impossible.
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One traditional Anti-Forensic technique
is to overwrite or otherwise destroy data.
Overwriting: Eliminate data or metadata (e.g. disk sanitizers, Microsoft Word 
metadata “washers,” timestamp eliminators.)
Disk Sanitizers; Free Space Sanitizers; File Shredders
• Microsoft Remove Hidden Data Tool; cipher.exe; ccleaner
Metadata Erasers
• Example: timestomp
Hard problem: What should be overwritten? 
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Anti-Forensic tools can hide data with
cryptography or steganography.
Cryptographic File Systems (EFS, TrueCrypt)
Encrypted Network Protocols (SSL, SSH, Onion Routing*)
Program Packers (PECompact, Burneye) & Rootkits
Steganography
Data Hiding in File System Structures
• Slacker — Hides data in slack space
• FragFS — Hides in NTFS Master File Table
• RuneFS — Stores data in “bad blocks”
• KY FS — Stores data in directories
• Data Mule FS — Stores in inode reserved space
• Host Protected Areas & Device Configuration Overlay
*Onion routing also protects from traffic analysis
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Anti-Forensics 3: Minimizing the Footprint
Overwriting and Data Hiding are easy to detect.
• Tools leave tell-tale signs; examiners know what to look for.
• Statistical properties are different after data is overwritten or hidden.
AF tools that minimize footprint avoiding leaving traces for later analysis.
• Memory injection and syscall proxying
• Live CDs, Bootable USB Tokens
• Virtual Machines
• Anonymous Identities and Storage
(don’t worry; we have slides for each of these)
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Memory Injection and Userland Execve:
Running a program without loading the code.
Memory Injection loads code without having the code on the disk.
• Buffer overflow exploits — run code supplied as (oversized) input
Userland Execve 
— Runs program without using execve()
— Bypasses logging and access control
— Works with code from disk or read from network
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Syscall proxying: 
Running a program without the code!
Syscall Proxying
• Program runs on one computer, syscalls executed on another.
• Program not available for analysis
• May generate a lot of network traffic












Client Kernel Server Kernel
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Live CDs, Bootable USB Tokens, Virtual Machines:
Running code without leaving a trace.
Most forensic information is left in the file system of the running computer.
These approaches keep the attacker’s file system segregated:
— In RAM (CDs & Bootable USB Tokens)
— In the Virtual Machine file (where it can be securely deleted)
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Anonymous Identities and Storage: 
The attacker’s data may be anywhere.
Attackers have long made use of anonymous e-mail accounts. 
Today these accounts are far more powerful.
• Yahoo and GMail both have 2GB of storage
• APIs allow this storage to be used as if it were a file system
Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) and Simple Storage Service (S3) 
provide high-capability, little-patrolled services to anyone with a credit card
• EC2: 10 ¢/CPU hour (Xen-based virtual machines)
• S3: 10 ¢/GB-Month
With BGP, it’s possible to have “anonymous IP addresses.”
1. Announce BGP route
2. Conduct attack
3. Withdraw BGP address
 Being used by spammers today
(http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0602/pdf/feamster.pdf)
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Attacking the Investigator: 
AF techniques that exploit CFT bugs.
Craft packets to exploit buffer-overflow bugs in network monitoring programs 
like tcpdump, snort and ethereal.
Create files that cause EnCase to crash.
Successful attacks provide:
➡ Ability to run code on the forensic appliance
➡ Erase collected evidence
➡ Break the investigative software
➡ Leak information about the analyst or the investigation
➡ Implicate the investigator
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Attacking the Investigator: 
Denial-of-Service Attacks against the CFT
Any CFT resource whose use is determined by input can be overwhelmed.
• Create millions of files or identities
• Overwhelm the logging facility
• Compression bombs — 42.zip














Anti-Forensic Tools can detect 
Computer Forensic Tools: cat-and-mouse.
SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) drives report:
• Total number of power cycles
• Total time hard drive has been on
Network Forensics can be detected with:
• Hosts in “promiscuous” mode responding differently
— to PINGs.
— to malformed packets
— to ARPs
• Hosts responding to traffic not intended to them (MAC vs. IP address)









Improve the tools — many CFTs are poorly written.




— Defeat encrypted file systems with keyloggers.
— Augment network sniffers with traffic analysis
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Many forensic techniques in use today can be circumvented




• Anonymous identities & resources
• Exploit bugs in computer forensic tools to hide
New approaches:
• Minimizing or eliminating memory footprints
• Virtual machines
• Direct attacks against computer forensic tools
http://www.simson.net/ref/2007/slides-ICIW.pdf
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Research directions in Computer Forensics
Environmental Data Survey Projects
• Phone systems
• Hard drives & data storage devices
• Network hosts and traffic
Theory and Algorithm Development:
• Brian Carrier 2006 PhD
• Cross-Drive Analysis 







Forensic analysis is a growth area. 
Being a practitioner is hard:
• Many skills 
• Many tools
• In-depth knowledge of many different systems
What is the forensics research agenda?
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Other Resources
http://www.forensicswiki.org/
http://www/forensicwiki.com/
http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/forensics.html
http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/426/426links.htm
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